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Simulation modelThis paper aims at analysing the impacts of interdependencies between electricity and natural gas sys-
tems in terms of security of energy supply. When analysing both systems several interdependencies
can be observed, however, the most significant interdependencies are as follows: (1) gas dependency
of gas fired power plants in electricity system and (2) electric dependency of electric-driven compressors
in gas system. Since both systems depend on each other, it is of major interest from an energy security
perspective to investigate how failures triggered in either of the systems propagate from one system
to the other. We proposed an integrated simulation model that aims at reflecting the dynamics of the sys-
tems in case of disruptions and takes the cascading effects of these disruptions into account. While devel-
oping the integrated model, first electricity and gas systems are modelled separately and then linked by
an (MATLAB-based) interface. The effectiveness of the proposed model is investigated using characteristic
disruption scenarios. Computational results demonstrate that the integrated simulation model is very
user-friendly and quite effective and efficient in analysing the interactions between electricity and gas
systems.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).Introduction
Critical energy infrastructures (CEIs) including electricity, natu-
ral gas and oil systems, provide fuel that is essential for the contin-
uous and reliable functioning of national or regional security,
economic operations, public health and safety. The disruption or
loss of functionality of these infrastructures would have weakening
impact on the defense and economic security and quality of life.
CEI systems are not isolated but increasingly interconnected and
interdependent with the development of modern technology. For
instance reliable electricity supply is a necessity throughout the
natural gas system in order to maintain the normal operation while
natural gas delivery is a requirement to generate electricity in gas
fired power plants (GFPPs). Higher interdependencies between CEI
systems make the entire energy system more vulnerable than ever
since a disruption occurring in one system (e.g. an unexpected fail-
ure) has consequences on the other dependent systems and possi-
bly even back to the system where the disruption originated. Thesetight relations are increasing the potential risk for catastrophic
events, triggered by cascading effects of intentional and uninten-
tional types of disruptions. The growing importance of this risk is
also realized by the governments and they focused on strengthen-
ing the national energy policy framework to provide sustainable
energy supply with affordable services [1]. Several organizations
have published reports providing key inputs into the development
of energy policies [2–5]. The main aim of National Energy Security
Assessment (NESA) analysis is to identify the key energy security
issues. This takes the main factors challenging the adequate, reli-
able and competitive delivery of energy in each of the liquid fuels,
natural gas and electricity sectors into consideration. European
commission initiatives such as ‘‘Green Paper on A European Pro-
gramme for Critical Infrastructure Protection/2005’’ [3] and ‘‘Coun-
cil Directive 114/2008 on the Identification and Designation of
European Critical Infrastructures and the Assessment of the Need
to Improve Their Protection’’ [5] issued the identification of CEIs,
analysing their interdependencies and improving the protection
policies. Moreover recent studies in the energy security literature
focused on introducing new approaches and trends on energy
security to deal with its increased complex and multi-dimensioned
nature [6–9]. In [6], the authors highlighted the need for focusing
the entire energy system and developing an integrated approach
in solving energy security challenges. The knowledge required for
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derived from political and natural science, engineering, economics,
and systems analysis. The first perspective, sovereignty mainly
deals with strategic security, international relations and political
science while the second perspective robustness, deals with phys-
ical vulnerabilities of dynamic, integrated energy systems and
includes the concepts of engineering and natural science. The last
perspective resilience, which originated from economics and com-
plexity science, is based on increasing the withstanding ability of
the energy system from various disruptions and protecting the sys-
tem against threats by long term investments and technologies.
Electricity and gas are two important CEI systems and they both
rely on networks operating at transmission (high current electric-
ity grids or high pressure gas networks, respectively) and distribu-
tion level (low current electricity grids or low pressure gas
networks, respectively) to deliver energy from generation points
(electric power plants/gas wells) to end consumers. Traditionally,
the operations and evaluation of both systems are handled sepa-
rately; however electricity and gas systems are interdependent
and each system has significant impacts on the performance and
efficiency of each other. Gas system network consists of different
components that depend on electrical power in order to operate
the network (electric driven compressors, underground gas storage
facilities, key valves, regulators, drilling rigs, etc.). Moreover, the
usage of electric driven compressors is increasing due to lower
installation and maintenance costs. In addition many regions
require emission standards that oblige the use of electric driven
compressors [10]. On the other hand electricity networks utilize
gas as a safe and secure fossil fuel mainly due to its environmental
friendliness and global occurrence. Shale gas production has
already had a significant impact on the deployment of new infra-
structures, especially in USA, where the installed capacity of GFPP
has dramatically increased during the last years and is expected to
continue increasing in the coming years, which has obviously
increased the dependency of the electricity system on the gas sys-
tem [11]. This could also be the case in other regions of the world,
including Europe, especially under scenarios of abundant cheap
shale gas and low carbon policies. Moreover, modern GFPPs can
be also used flexibly, in most cases as a backup for intermittent
renewable energy sources, mainly wind and solar energy. Current
plans for an increased installation of renewable energy sources will
further increase the role of gas as a backup for electricity genera-
tion. Because of the close interactions between electricity and gas
systems, analysing the systems independently may not provide
adequate information to ensure the proper functioning of the
energy supply system. Besides, it is a quite insufficient approach
in today’s world since the continuity of energy supply has become
a major concern for most of the countries.
In this paper we aim at analysing the interdependent electricity
and gas system network behaviours in terms of cascading failure
effects from one system into another in the context of energy secu-
rity. The consequences are investigated when the electricity or gas
system has just experienced a disruption, like failure of a pipeline
or a transmission line. According to the classifications in [6], this
paper deals with robustness and resilience perspectives of energy
security since it considers the technical failures of the components
and evaluates the resilience of the entire system under these fail-
ure scenarios. An efficient and flexible modelling tool which con-
siders bi-directional interactions is introduced and as far as the
known literature, there is no work published on analysing the
two systems in such a detail and aspects. Two types of basic depen-
dencies are considered; (a) dependency of gas fired power plants
(GFPP) in electricity network system on natural gas supply, and
(b) dependency of electric driven compressors in gas network sys-
tem on electricity supply. The modelling of interdependencies and
their effects on failure propagation is carried out within the simu-lation framework of a failure cascade process. The developed inte-
grated simulation model incorporates AC power flow model and a
complete hydraulic gas model to represent real world applications
accurately. Moreover, since the dynamics in a gas system network
is slower than that observed in the electricity, the simulation time
steps are considered to be different. Later on, the effectiveness of
the proposed model is investigated under different disruption
scenarios. The results of the simulations are used to identify the
system’s contributions to cascading failures and feedback mecha-
nisms among the systems. The results proof that analysing systems
in an integrated manner provide a good knowledge on the vulner-
abilities of the interdependent electricity and gas system, which
could not be detected by analysing the systems individually.
The paper proceeds as follows: literature review is given in Sec-
tion ‘Literature review’, the proposed integrated simulation model
for the gas and electricity systems is described in Section ‘Proposed
integrated simulation model’; computational analysis on test prob-
lems are discussed in Section ‘Computational results’ and conclu-
sions are given in Section ‘Conclusions’.Literature review
While extensive research that considers the systems individu-
ally can be found in literature, an integrated analysis of electricity
and gas systems is rare. Identifying the limitations of one system as
a result of changes in the other has recently become an active
research area, since it is the responsibility of the decision makers
to ensure the system operability and resilience in case of disrup-
tions in the systems. The research in integrated analysis of electric-
ity and gas systems can be classified in terms of technical,
economic and security aspects. Comprehensive reviews of the
approaches can be found in [12–14].
In [13], authors classify the research on integrated electricity
and gas systems in terms of various economic and technical per-
spectives. The first approach is essentially based on economic eval-
uations aiming at exploring the interactions between the
mechanisms of pricing of each carrier. This can be achieved by
means of economic models, where the influence of technical con-
straints is often ignored or taken into account in a simplified
way. In this field, an important effort has been devoted to clearing
price mechanisms for coupled gas and electricity markets, espe-
cially at a trans-national level [15–18]. Other works are related
to the developing of procedures for optimizing different time
scales of natural gas portfolio of an electric generation company
owning gas-fired power plants under stochastic price scenarios
[19–21]. Additionally in [22,23] market models have been pro-
posed for analysing the behaviour that a single subject would take
as a player in the two markets, where it may be a buyer of gas and
an electricity producer. Network pricing of gas and electricity is
defined as a key element for placing new generation plants in [24].
The technical analysis of integrated electricity and gas systems
generally focuses on operational planning and the models can be
classified according to the considered time horizons as; medium-
term, short-term and snapshot models. While medium-term scales
range from one month to a year and short-term applications deal
with hours and days, snapshot models consider a single system
configuration for operation planning. A generalized network flow
model is proposed in [25] for integrated analysis of electricity,
gas and coal systems for a multi-period analysis. The simulation
studies of the network flow model in [25] are given in [26] for a
configuration of the U.S.A. energy system with medium term oper-
ational optimization. A complete gas model and a DC power flow
model are used for integrated analysis in [27] where gas storage
is also considered. The methodology links the two systems through
gas fired power plants and aims at minimizing the total operating
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term operation planning, a security constrained unit commitment
(SCUC) of power generation plants considering natural gas prices is
presented in [28] and the extension of the model by including nat-
ural gas contract costs is proposed in [29]. Additionally, the gas
network constraints are incorporated as a network flow model
and dual fuel units are modelled for analysing different fuel avail-
ability scenarios. In [30], the SCUC problem in [29] is considered
using a more detailed gas model in which gas flow in pipelines is
described through a quadratic function of pressure and the gas
consumption of the compressors are also included. The transient
analysis of gas flows is modelled in [31] for the unit commitment
problem and steady state and transient models of gas system are
compared.
Power flow optimization models are developed for a snapshot
configuration of the integrated electricity and gas systems to ana-
lyse the combined network behaviour in detail [32–34].
The security perspective including the reliability and the ade-
quacy of gas and electricity networks, along with the mutual influ-
ence of these aspects in combined studies is another important
field of investigation. Such studies may include the effect of contin-
gencies or events that reduce the performance of related networks
[35–38]. The approach of ‘‘energy hub’’ for multiple energy carrier
systems can help to analyse some of these aspects with different
time scales and sizes [39–42]. An energy hub is a multi-generation
system where multiple energy carriers input to the hub are con-
verted, conditioned, stored and distributed by using several tech-
nologies. Particularly the conversion process is modelled through
a matrix of coupling factors between input and output power [43].
Most of the works in the literature dealing with the interactions
between electricity and gas systems are considering only the gas
dependency of the electricity system. The electric dependency of
gas systems are not studied enough. We believe this is because a
large number of components in the gas transmission network
use gas from pipelines as a power source and this make the system
less dependent on electricity. However, the increasing number of
electricity dependent components makes the gas system vulnera-
ble to a disruption in the connected electricity grid. Recently some
researchers have considered bi-directional dependencies of these
systems [10,44–47]. In [44], a methodological approach to analyse
structural and functional vulnerabilities of interdependent gas and
electricity system is introduced. Different from our study the
authors used simplified models for both systems; DC power flow
model for electric systems which ignores voltage fluctuations dur-
ing cascading effects of failures and a simplified gas model based
on dynamic approach.
A tabulated summary of the relevant studies in the literature for
integrated electricity and gas network systems is presented in
Table 1, which shows the scope of the analysis and modelling
approach for interdependency effects. It should be noted that some
studies appear in different cells of the table as they include more
than one aspect. As regards to scope of the study, different perspec-Table 1
Summary of studies on scope and modelling approach.
Modelling approach Scope
Economic perspective Technica
mt
Agent-based [23]
Economics theory [15–22,24]
Topological network-based [25,26]
Functional network-based [27]
Empirical [45,46]
a ISM: Proposed integrated simulation model.tives described in the first paragraph of this section are as follows;
economic perspective, technical perspective and security perspec-
tive. Technical perspectives are classified according to the time
scale considered in the scope of the study: medium-term, short-
term, and snapshot models. In terms of interdependency effects
modelling, the four general categories provided in [48] are used:
(1) agent-based, (2) economics theory, (3) network-based, and
(4) empirical modelling approaches. In agent-based approaches,
infrastructures are modelled as complex adaptive systems com-
posed of agents interacting with both its environment and other
agents of the infrastructure. The agent makes behaviour decisions
based on a set of rules to represent the real world occupant. The
second approach economics theory, mainly through the input–out-
put modelling, has been used to analyse risk dependencies among
different interdependent infrastructures. Network-based approach
uses graph theory to exploit the network structure of infrastruc-
tures, where nodes represent the different components of the
infrastructure and the edges represent the physical links between
components. Network-based models can be classified as topologi-
cal and functional according to the detail used to mimic the infra-
structure. While the topological models consider only the
topological description of the infrastructures the functional models
deal with flow patterns and mathematical modelling of the inter-
dependencies. Finally, empirical approach uses the outcomes of
historical data and expert experiences to analyse the properties
of infrastructures interdependencies.
According to Table 1, the integrated simulation model pre-
sented in this work, symbolized as ISM, deals with the security per-
spective and the modelling strategy of the interdependency effects
falls in the functional network based approach. Different from our
study the other models in this group ([35,36,38]) are mainly based
on the operational planning of systems in case of contingencies and
they do not analyse the system vulnerabilities in the context of
cascading failure effects. Moreover, they consider only one system
dependency on the other one, and the bi-directional dependencies
are still in need of further research whereas this gap is addressed
within this paper.Proposed integrated simulation model
The modelling development carried out in this paper considers
interdependent electricity and gas transmission systems networks.
The interdependencies taken into account are gas usage of GFPP’s
and power needs of compressors. The model architecture is based
on an integrated simulation tool and is composed of (a) an electric-
ity simulation tool based upon AC power flowmodel including fail-
ure effects analysis functions, (b) a gas simulation tool based on a
hydraulic model using detailed physics of pipe and non-pipe ele-
ments that includes failure effects analysis functions, and (c) the
interface module enabling data exchange between two individual
simulation models by means of physical equations.l perspective Security perspective
st ss
[39–41]
[42]
[28,29,37,44,47]
[30,31] [12,32–36,38] [35,36,38] [ISMa]
[10]
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tion of programming environment and the selection of correct
tools and methods are essential. During the literature survey many
software tools for electricity and gas that can be used to analyse
both systems separately were found. However, there was no avail-
able software package that could run the two models with this
detail together, which required a new solution and methodology
to be applied within the scope of the work. Additionally, in order
to perform a technical, realistic and reliable analysis, the models
should be flexible for modifications and enable easy data import-
ing/exporting.
In the scope of the above mentioned requirements, we mod-
elled the electricity and gas systems using MATLAB based pro-
grams, which provide seamless integration of the separate
models into a final integrated one. This approach is shown in Fig. 1.
The ‘‘Electricity Model’’ uses AC power flow available in the
MATLAB based ‘‘MATPOWER toolbox’’ for solving power flow equa-
tions. In parallel, the gas model uses a MATLAB based developed
hydraulic model for pipeline flow equations. The schematics also
depict the interactions between separate models and also include
the inputs and outputs of each individual model. The failure effect
analysis is also embedded in the integrated model within MATLAB.
Prior to identifying the proposed integrated simulation model,
details of the individual models for electricity and gas systems
are presented in the following sections.
The electricity model
Electricity systems are composed of three main subsystems;
generation units, transmission and distribution networks, respec-
tively. Generation units are responsible for the production of
power. The generated power is then delivered to end consumers
via transmission and distribution networks. Transmission net-
works transport high voltage power to distribution substations
and distribution networks supply the low voltage energy to end
users. This work will mainly focus on transmission network
applications.
In a transmission network, power flows through different buses
and lines connecting these buses. A bus is used to represent gener-
ation units and loads, whereas lines are defined as transmission
lines. Power flow studies in such a network will provide solutions
for the voltage at each bus of the network, active and reactiveFig. 1. Integrated electripower flows through transmission lines, and power injections of
generation units and loads under steady state conditions. Power
flow analysis is also very important in addressing the operating
conditions of the network. It will help the system operator to
determine voltage violations on buses and overloading levels on
transmission lines which can be observed in case of failures.
The electricity model developed in this work is designed to pro-
vide a realistic representation of the behaviour of a power system
when a failure occurs in transmission lines in terms of cascading
failure effects. Analysing cascading failures is very challenging
due to large number of unexpected sequence of failures depending
on the initial failure. To overcome this challenge serious of cascad-
ing failure models have been developed [49,50]. These models can
be either network topology based or can include the power flows.
In [51] the authors compared a power flow model with a complex
network based model.
In this paper a power flow based failure cascading model
including series of failure propagation functions is implemented.
For example, bus isolation, overloading control and reloading func-
tions have been implemented under failure effect analysis.
The flowchart of the developed electricity model with failure
affect analysis is given in Fig. 2 and details of the processes are
explained simultaneously.Normal operation state & Simulate Random failures
As shown in Fig. 2, the system is initialized with an input data
set which gives detailed information on characteristics and con-
straints related to buses (including loads and/or generation units)
and transmission lines. In our implementation the readily available
input data for IEEE 30 bus test case has been used. The details of
this test case will be provided in computational results section.
Starting from normal operation up to the failure operation state,
the system is drawn by some random failures. The initialization
failures in electricity systems are considered only on transmission
lines as they can often be encountered in real life applications.
Transmission lines in power systems are highly vulnerable even
to small failure events because they expand a large geographical
area and they highly exposure to environment [9]. In the context
of the proposed model generation unit failures can occur during
the cascading effects of the initial failures. Detailed classification
of threats in power systems can be found in [9].city and gas model.
Fig. 2. Electricity model with failure effect analysis.
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For addressing the electricity transmission through the network
the AC or DC power flow model can be used. DC power flow
method simplifies the non-linear power flow problem to set of lin-
ear equations by making series of approximations, such as; ignor-
ing node voltages and reactive power balance. However, voltage
profile of buses and reactive power have significant impacts on
the system conditions when perturbed by failure events and disre-
garding their effects may provide too optimistic results and could
threaten the operation security [52]. While the DC power provides
good and fast estimations of power flow equations it may be too
optimistic regarding the impact of the system especially if the sys-
tem is constrained by reactive generation limits and voltage limits.
In this paper AC power flow method is adopted for evaluating the
system behaviour under cascading failure effects. This level of
detail is required since the system is constrained by voltage limits.
The AC power flow model calculations have been implemented
using MATPOWER 4.1., which is a free package of MATLAB m-files
used for solving power flow and optimal power flow problems. For
solving the AC power flow equations MATPOWER presents three
solvers. The default power flow solver is based on a standard
Newton’s Method [53] using a full Jacobian that is updated at each
iteration. The other two power flow solvers are variations of the
fast-decoupled method [54].
An importantpointhere is that,most of thepowerflowsolvers do
not have the capability to identify disconnections, which occur dur-
ing the failure of one or usuallymore transmission lines. In addition,
similar to other solvers, MATPOWER does not check the topology
before solving the equations, and if there are disconnections in the
network, the model will not converge. To overcome this problem, a
topological checking function is developed and before every run ofAC power flow, it is run a priori, as the failures can lead to some dis-
connections in the network. The topological checking function is
based on well-known spanning tree problem in the literature.
Given a connected graph, a spanning tree of that graph is a sub-
graph, which is a tree and connects all the vertices together. From a
practical point of view, this algorithm has important applications
in transportation, communications, distribution systems, etc. For
a summary of its properties and algorithms for its solution, see
Papadimitriou and Steiglitz [55]. In this work, the spanning tree
algorithm is solved to identify the unconnected buses. An uncon-
nected bus is excluded from the power flow equations. The algo-
rithm for the topological checking is presented below;
Topological Checking Algorithm
Let G = (V, E) be a connected, undirected graph with a real-
valued weight function w defined on E. Let A be a subset of
E that is included in some spanning tree for G, let (S, V  S)
be any cut of G and (u, v) be an edge crossing the cut
(S, V  S),
Step1. Choose the root node r; Set S = {r} and A = ;.
Step2. Find the minimum weighted edge such that one end
point is in S and the other end point is in V n S. Add this
edge to A and its endpoint to S.
Step3. If V n S ¼ ;, then stop and output spanning tree (S, A).
Otherwise go to Step 2.Simulate cascading effects
In case of failure analysis the cascading effects of these failures
should also be considered. If the system has enough resilience for
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we can say that the system is preserving its normal operational
conditions. However, the failure(s) can result in different situations
(i.e. bus isolation, voltage or capacity violations). These are the cas-
cading effects of the failures and all of them are handled in the
model to reflect the real life applications.
For addressing the cascading effects, firstly, the capacity limita-
tions of the transmission lines are checked and if the amount of
power flow through that line exceeds the value of an upper limit
(capacity  tolerance parameter (a)) the line is classified as failed
element and is removed. This is defined as ‘‘overloading analysis’’
function. The removal of the lines can easily lead to voltage col-
lapses. Therefore the voltage level of each bus is checked within
the ‘‘voltage analysis’’ function since all buses have to satisfy a
voltage profile. When the voltage level of a bus is violated, the load
of the corresponding bus is reduced until the voltage constraint is
satisfied. During this reduction process, if the amount of load is
decreased more than 50% of its original load, then the node is
assumed to be failed and the load value of the bus is set to ‘‘0’’. This
is called the ‘‘reloading’’ function and the algorithm for the reload-
ing function is presented below:
Reloading Algorithm
Let n be number of buses in the network and Vi and V
min
i is the
nodal voltage and minimum nodal voltage level for the bus
i respectively. Let CN is the critical nodes set, and Lop and Li
are operational and real load levels for bus i, and finally let
rp is the reduction percentage of the load,
Step1. For i = 1 to n, if Vi < V
min
i then, i e CN
Step2. While CN = ;,
for i = 1 to n, Li = Li  rp
if Li < Lop  0.50 then Li = 0,
run Power Flow
Step3. Stop the algorithmFig. 3. Gas model with failure effect analysis.Calculate the efficiency
As this work aims at analysing failures within the short interval
of time, buses and transmission lines of the electricity network are
considered to shut down irreversibly (i.e. once they are switched
off during the simulation of a cascading failure (due to a failure
being propagated) they are assumed to be failed for the remaining
period of the simulation and the transition between simulation
steps is assumed to be static). The AC failure model runs until
the system goes into steady-state or in some cases if the system
cannot reach a steady state then we can say that it has totally
failed. The efficiency of the network is used as a performance mea-
sure, which is defined as the ratio of the total loading at the final
stage to the initial amount of total loading.
The gas model
In most of the natural gas systems, the geographical location of
the gas deposit and the location where it is needed are many kilo-
metres apart [56]. Therefore, there is a necessity to transport nat-
ural gas from its deposit and production site to its consumers,
either by trucks and ships in the form of Liquefied Natural Gas
(LNG) or through gas pipeline transmission networks.
Gas networks are generally distinguished according to their
function and pressure levels in gas transmission and gas distribu-
tion networks. Gas transmission networks are high pressure net-
works and serve the purpose of transporting gas thousands of
kilometres from its deposit and production site to locations where
gas is needed for consumption or storage. Gas distribution net-works, in contrast, are low pressure networks and in most cases
directly connected to the gas transmission grid. Their function is
to distribute natural gas coming from the transmission grid to
end consumers, e.g. households, industries, etc. The scope of this
work is mainly on gas transmission networks.
The transmission of gas through pipelines requires a certain
pressure gradient. Due to friction between the transported gas
and the inner walls of the pipelines and also heat transfer between
the pipeline and its surroundings, the pressure and enthalpy of the
gas drops significantly along the pipeline in flow direction. These
pressure and enthalpy losses are compensated by compressor sta-
tions, whose function is to increase the pressure and enthalpy of
the gas. Compressor stations can be either gas-driven or electric-
driven. A failure in a compressor station, for instance due to lack
of electric power, can cause a gas delivery pressure below the min-
imum delivery pressure or even a total loss of deliverability to end
consumers. In addition, other facilities like regulators and valves
are utilized to control and regulate the gas flow in the network.
A gas transmission network, thus, consist of several different com-
ponents which need to be considered when developing a numeri-
cal model of the network.
The gas model developed in this work is used for analysing the
impact of failures on flows and pressures in the gas system net-
work. The flowchart of the gas model with failure effect analysis
is shown in Fig. 3 and the details of the functions are described
in following.
The gas model starts with initial input data related to network
components. The components of the gas system under study are
nodes, pipelines and compressors. Nodes can have different pur-
poses depending on their locations and connections with incident
pipes. Each node i has a corresponding load Li, which if positive is
equal to the amount of gas extracted from the network or if nega-
tive, the amount of gas injected, respectively.
Similar to the electricity model initial failures in the gas model
are simulated randomly on pipelines. As the developed gas model
will be used in integrated analysis of gas and electricity the cascad-
ing effects of failures in the gas system are considered according to
the time horizon in which electricity network is modelled. There-
fore cascading pipeline failures as a result of overloading are
neglected since a contingency on the gas system slightly affects
the short-term transients. In case of an initial failure the pressure
limitations can be violated and to overcome this problem same
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the nodes which have pressures below the prespecified value the
amount of loads are reduced until the pressures are all satisfied.
If the new load value is below 50% of the initial load then the node
is closed. An important assumption which would affect the results
of the gas model is the direction of gas in the pipelines. In this
paper all pipelines have been modelled as bidirectional. In case
of failures, uni-directionality would most likely led to worse results
in performance measures because of loss of flexibility in the gas
model.
The equations describing the flow rate in pipelines at steady
state are diverse, mainly due to difficulty in quantifying the effects
of friction [57]. However, all equations have a common origin
which is Bernoulli’s equation. The flow equations applied in the
industry are very often in the following generalised form:
Qk ¼ Kk  p21  p22
  1
m1 ð1Þ
where Qk is the flow rate in branch k, p1 and p2 the nodal pressures
at the in- and outlet node of branch k, respectively, and Kk the flow
constant which depends on pipe and gas properties (e.g. pipe length
and diameter, friction factor, gas compressibility, etc.). The flow
exponent m1 is between m1 = 1.848 and m1 = 2, depending on the
pressure level of the network.
The pipe equation gives a solution for the flow rate in each indi-
vidual pipe k for a given square DPk ¼ p21  p22. However, additional
equations a necessary in order to find a steady state solution for
the entire network. These equations are derived from Kirchhof’s
first law:
L
!¼ A  Q! ð2Þ
where L
!
is the vector of nodal loads, A is the branch-nodal inci-
dence matrix and Q
!
the vector of pipe flows. The previous explana-
tions are mainly based on networks without non-pipe facilities like
compressors, regulators or valves. However, for a more realistic
analysis of the problem these facilities need to be integrated into
the model. The following correlation between the nodal loads at
the inlet (Lin) and outlet (Lout), and the flow through each non-pipe
facility (f) is assumed:
f ¼ Lin ¼ Lout ð3Þ
The integration of non-pipe facilities leads to a slight modifica-
tion of Eq. (2). Taking Eq. (3) and the following relations
D P
!¼ AT  P!¼ Kk  jQ
!jm11  Q! ð4Þ
^ ¼ Kk  jQ
!jm11 ð5Þ
into account Eq. (5) is modified to
A^1AT  P!¼  L! K ~f ð6Þ
where P
!
marks the vector of nodal square pressures, K the node
unit-incidence matrix and ~f , the vector of flows through each
non-pipe facility and the nodal loads at each source node. The intro-
duction of unit flows f is connected to an imbalance of equations
and unknowns, which makes the entire problem infeasible. In order
to balance the system one additional independent equation for each
added non-pipe facility is inevitable. One way of achieving these
equations is to assume a linear correlation between the nodal
square pressures at the in-and outlet Pin and Pout respectively, and
the gas flow rate f through each unit in the following form:
C1  Pin þ C2  Pout þ C3  f ¼ d ð7Þ
where C1, C2, C3 and d are constant coefficients of the respective
variables. Thus, this is a linearization of the non-linear equations
describing the physics of each non-pipe facility. Having developedthe linearized equation system for non-pipe facilities the governing
equation system describing the steady state of a gas transmission
network with non-pipe facilities is as follows:
GN bG KIbGT _G KO
C1 C2 C3
264
375  P
!
1
P
!
2
f
!
2664
3775 ¼
 L!1
 L!2
d
!
2664
3775 ð8Þ
where GN; bG and _G are matrices derived from the decomposition of
matrix G:
G ¼ A^1AT ¼ GN
bGbGT _G
" #
ð9Þ
The equation system describing the steady state of gas trans-
mission networks Eq. (8) is non-linear, and therefore unsolvable
in an analytical manner. However, a solution with a marginal
and acceptable deviation from the exact solution can be obtained
by applying iterative methods such as the Newton-Methods. One
of these is the Newton-Loop-Node Method, which is used in this
paper to solve the system of equations. The first step in this
method is the preconditioning of the system, meaning finding
accurate initial approximations for the branch flows Qk. This is
obtained by the dendrite method which is based on the Breadth
First Search (BFS) algorithm [57], and the assumption that all nodal
loads in the dendrite are supplied by the nodes with a known pres-
sure (mainly source and auxiliary nodes), which are also referred to
as reference nodes. The BFS transfers the original network to a tree
(dendrite) which in contrast to the original network is without any
loops, and includes all nodes, but not all branches (branches not
included in the dendrite are called chords) of the original network.
The root(s) of the resulting dendrite coincides with the reference
nodes. The first step after the preconditioning is to calculate the
resulting loads Lin and Lout for each unit followed by solving the lin-
ear equation (Eq. (8)) for the square pressures P
!
and unit flows f
using Cholesky’s method by substituting the matrix GN from Eq.
(8) with the lower L and upper U Cholesky matrices. The solution
is then used to calculate a correction to the chord flows DQc which
is in turn used to calculate new pipe flow Qk+1. The last step is to
calculate the errors and compare it against a specified tolerance.
If the errors are less than the tolerance then an acceptable solution
is obtained and the computation is stopped, otherwise the compu-
tation continues with the next iterations until an acceptable solu-
tion is achieved. The iteration is aborted if the iteration errors show
a diverging character or if the errors are still greater than the tol-
erance after a specified number of iterations. The details of the
method can be found in [57]. The method is implemented in
MATLAB.
The integrated simulation model
After modelling the two systems separately, the next step is to
integrate them with an interface based on dependencies. As men-
tioned in the previous sections the interactions are defined as two-
sided. The electricity network has different type of generation units
and some of them are gas fired power plants (GFPPs) and the com-
pressors in the gas network are assumed as electric-driven and
need external power input to operate. The flowchart of the inte-
grated model for one simulation time is given in Fig. 4.
In order to analyse the effectiveness of the integrated model
and the interactions between gas and electricity systems the fol-
lowing test cases are selected. The well-known IEEE 30 bus case
is used for the electricity system whereas the gas network is taken
from [57], whose size and complexity is at the level of a transmis-
sion grid of a medium-sized European country (e.g. Spain and
Poland). The topological representations of the test cases are pre-
Fig. 4. Flowchart of the integrated model for one simulation time.
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be found in [58,57] respectively.
Computational results
In order to determine if failures in either of the electricity or gas
system have an effect on the other, random failure scenarios are
implemented on either system, after which the result of the model
is analysed. The dependent components between two networks are
identified before conducting the analyses.
The assumptions for dependency assignments between two
networks are given below;Fig. 5. IEEE-30 bus system. Bus 1 is the slack bus; b– The electricity network is composed of 30 buses and 41 trans-
mission lines. Among these 30 buses, 6 of them are generation
units which serves 21 load nodes. As an initial scenario, 5 of 6
generation units are selected as GFPP and the total production
capacity of the GFPP’s are set to 70% of the total generation
capacity of the system. Gas consumptions of GFPP’s are related
to power production by a linear coefficient.
– The gas network is composed of 22 nodes and 35 pipelines. 18
of the nodes are load nodes and there is only one source node.
There are 3 compressor stations and 3 of them are assumed as
electric-driven. For simplicity the ratio of the compressor sta-
tions are calculated by a linear function of the power input.
Following the above assumptions several simulations of the
integrated model for failure analyses has been conducted. Fig. 7
shows the resulting total loadings of the systems in case of failures
at transmission lines 2–6 and 5–7.
The remarks below can be extracted following the analysis of
the above scenario;
In order to determine the exact reasons for cascading effects of
the failures, the electricity model is run independently with the
same failure scenario and the results obtained are provided in
Fig. 8.
Fig. 8 shows that the integrated model and the independent
model results for electricity loadings are same. We can conclude
that the integrated model analysis is only beneficial in providing
us the effects on the gas network in case of an initial transmission
line failure. It should be noted that this assumption holds only for
this specific scenario unless further simulations are implemented.
In order to understand the results when the initial failures occur
at pipelines the following analysis is presented. The gas model is
run with the pipeline 3–4 and 5–7 failures scenario and results
are given in Fig. 9.
The gas model is also run independently with the same pipeline
failure scenario and the results are presented in the graph below
(Fig. 10).
The results show that the electricity system has significant cas-
cading effects on the gas system in case of initial pipeline failures.
This is an expected result, because of the slow short term dynamics
of a gas system. Accordingly, the cascading effects of an initial
pipeline failure within the gas system are not observed during
the short term analysis.
The analysis up to now has assumed single scenarios and the
results were presented accordingly. In order to make a more reli-
able analysis, network efficiencies under different number of trans-
mission line/pipeline failures are calculated. Simulation results
presented for the network efficiencies are the average of 50 runs
of random failures for each number of removed line scenario.
In Fig. 11, gas system efficiencies under different number of
pipeline removal scenarios are calculated using both independentuses 2, 13, 22, 23 and 27 are generation units.
Fig. 6. 22 node gas transmission network. Node 1 is the source node and node 5, 13 and 16 are compressor stations.
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Fig. 7. Total loadings after failure of transmission lines 2–6 and 5–7.
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Fig. 8. Total loadings after failure of transmission lines 2–6 and 5–7 (independent
and integrated model results).
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Fig. 9. Total loadings after failure of pipelines 3–4 and 6–7.
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Fig. 10. Total loadings after failure of pipelines 3–4 and 6–7 (independent and
integrated model results).
Fig. 11. Interdependent and independent model results in gas system for different
number of random failures.
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Fig. 12. Interdependent and independent model results in the electric infrastruc-
ture for different number of random failures.
418 B.C. Erdener et al. / Electrical Power and Energy Systems 61 (2014) 410–420and integrated models. It can be seen that, integrated analysis is
very important for the gas system since the differences are big.
The reasons for these are the fast dynamics of the electricity sys-
tem and the effects of these dynamics on the gas system (e.g. inthe independent case, a pipeline failure will never lead to a failure
of a compressor, however, the electricity system may cause a com-
pressor failure in the integrated analysis).
The situation is not the same for the electric system as seen in
Fig. 12. The electric system is analysed under different number of
B.C. Erdener et al. / Electrical Power and Energy Systems 61 (2014) 410–420 419random transmission line failures using both independent and
integrated models and the results for the two models in terms of
network efficiencies are very close to each other. This result is
caused by the slow dynamics of the gas system and its weak effect
on the electricity system. For instance, although in one simulation
step, several dynamic changes occur in the electric system due to a
transmission line failure, the slow changing dynamics of the gas
systemwill not make an effect on the electric system in most cases.
Conclusions
This study deals with identifying the physical interactions
between electricity and gas systems in short term interval. There-
fore, an integrated model composed of independent gas and elec-
tricity models with failure effect analysis function is developed.
The results obtained show us that analysing two systems in an
integrated manner provides us very important details in terms of
system vulnerability.
The proposed integratedmodel uses the advantages of including
the detailed physics equations of both systems, since more realistic
results according to simplified network models can be achieved. In
order to construct the integrated model, first an electricity model
isdevelopedand thismodel canalsobeused toanalyse thecascading
effects of electricity system failures in short term intervals individu-
ally. The model includes topological checking and isolation, over-
loading and voltage collapse analysis and reloading functions
together with AC power flow model. Then a hydraulic gas model
with compressors is developed and the reloading function is added
to the model to further enhance the model capabilities to account
for the effects of failures. The last effort carried out is for combining
the electricity andgasmodels in the same software and it is achieved
using theMATLABenvironment. Different time scales of the systems
are also considered to reflect the real situations.
The effectiveness of the integrated model has been tested on a
simplified integrated network and found that, in terms of compu-
tational requirements and quality of the solution, the model proves
to be very useful. According to the results in most cases one line
failures do not affect neither the system itself nor the other system.
Two or more line failure effects are more visible and they can draw
the systems to disruptions. Due to physical interactions a failure
initially occurring in an electricity system has an effect on the
gas system and vice versa. However a very important finding is
related with the dynamics of the systems. This is due to the differ-
ent dynamics of gas and electricity systems involved. For instance,
when a failure occurs in the electricity network this will eventually
have an effect on the gas system as well. However, due to the slow
dynamics of gas system, the cascaded effect created from within
the gas system will not be as effective as the internal effects asso-
ciated within the electricity system itself. This is an important find-
ing, as we can say that in case of pipeline failures, the gas system
operator also has to consider the electricity system to identify all
type of contingencies in the gas system, however, for the electricity
system operator, it is not necessary to analyse both systems
together in case of transmission line failures in short term.
In the next future the model presented in this paper will be
applied to large scale real electricity and gas networks to address
the vulnerabilities of the both systems. Moreover, it will be
improved by adding restoration and repairing operations for med-
ium time intervals to make it more realistic and account for real
operational activities not into account in this first modelling
approach.
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